1	Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP78S01932A000100190034-1	
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	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WHITE HOUSE SUPPORT STAFF	25
C	12/00/WH12WH 74/2/7 Date: December 17, Item No.: WH #2	197
	DIRECTOR: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM	
	SUBJECT: THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM	2
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	Sharp fighting continues in the southern half of the	
	country, especially in the northern delta and in the prov-	
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	inces north of Saigon. Communist military action in north	ern
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Approved For Release 2003/08/08 : CIA-RDP78SD1932A000100190034-1, PAGE 1

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